Tag Archives: Terrorism

New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Regarding The Latest U.S. Barbarity In Nangarhar Province”

April 17, 2017

l_dzla8q

On 13 April 2017 at approximately 7:30 pm local time in Nangarhar’s Achin district, in the area of Mamund valley, American forces dropped – according to their statement – the largest non-nuclear bomb known as the ‘mother of all bombs’. This barbarity was followed with much fanfare with the Americans proudly boasting about it in the media thus showcasing the increasing barbarity of the foreign occupation.
The use and experimentation of such destructive weapons by foreign occupiers on our war-weary people and in every corner of our war-ravaged country is inexcusable. The Islamic Emirate condemns such barbarity in the strongest of terms and considers its perpetrators as war criminals. Such over-proportionate use of destruction poses long-term detriments for the environment and the development of our nation.
The repression of Daesh plots inside Afghanistan is the obligation of Afghans and not of foreigners. If the Americans fear for their security they should foil such plots at their own borders. The use of Daesh as a ploy to kill Afghans, bombard our lands, experiment novel weapons, and extend the illegitimate occupation is unacceptable. On the contrary, it is a historical wrong and a blatant aggression.
Through such actions the Americans hope to portray itself as a force against Daesh while at the same time giving this group visibility and legitimacy and therefore practically strengthening it. In recent months the Islamic Emirate carried out three separate operations against Daesh in Nangarhar yet every time the Mujahideen came close to completely eradicating this group, American aircraft would start bombarding the Mujahideen and forcing them to retreat.
The fact that the Americans claim that their presence in Afghanistan is limited only to a train and assist role while dropping 10 kiloton bombs on our lands only strengthens the voices of independence and Jihad in our land. Such barbarity illustrates that all freedom-loving Afghans ought to adopt a clear stance against the ongoing oppression of our country and no longer be fooled by American extenuations.
We believe that the use of heavy weaponry and destructive bombs in our country is not the answer to the current dilemma. Rather such irresponsible actions only light the flames of vengeance and show the ugly face of foreign occupation.
Zabihullah Mujahid
Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
17/07/1438 Lunar Hijri
26/01/1396 Solar Hijri

REGIONAL GUIDES TO LIFE AFTER ISLAMIC STATE.

Flag_of_Jordan.svg

JOAS WAGEMAKERS

JORDAN

IF THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS) IS DEFEATED AS A TERRITORIAL ENTITY, THE MAIN ASPECT THAT SETS

IT APART FROM AL-QAEDA – ITS CLAIM TO BE A STATE WITH ACTUAL TERRITORY – WILL BE GONE.

THIS MEANS IS WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO INVITE MUSLIMS TO JOIN ITS PROJECT IN SYRIA OR

IRAQ, BUT WILL BE FORCED TO RELY ON TERRORIST ATTACKS AROUND THE WORLD.

This shift in IS’s policies can already be seen, but is likely to increase as the

organisation loses more territory. From that point on, several scenarios

are possible. One scenario is that IS continues to operate as an alternative to al-Qaeda, with its local branches in countries such as Libya and Nigeria.

Given that both organisations will have roughly the same goals, they are likely to merge. Another scenario is that IS will dwindle and al-Qaeda will rise again.

Still another option is that they will continue to be rivals, with IS continuing to try to set up a state.

Any of these scenarios, and potentially others, are possible.

Given the tensions between al-Qaeda and IS and the inhibitions that some IS- supporters are likely to have had about IS’s increasingly violent policies, any future efforts to set up an Islamic state are likely to be slightly different.

There is a strong sentiment among many Jihadi-Salafi scholars and leaders that an Islamic state is a very good thing in principle, but that it should not be executed the way IS did it.

This analysis of the situation may result in more careful ways of going about

establishing an Islamic state the next time an opportunity arises.

In other words: for Jihadi-Salafi critics of IS, the collapse of the latter has the potential to be a major ‘I told you so’ moment.

In Jordan, there is the additional difficulty of intra-Jihadi-Salafi rivalry.

The two main Jihadi-Salafi scholars in the country (and probably in the

world) – Abu Qatada al-Filastini and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – have been strongly against IS from the beginning.

A large number of Jihadi-Salafi activists, however, disagree with them and still have fresh memories of the rivalry between their local hero – Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi – and al-Maqdisi.

While they see the former as a brave fighter who was willing to walk the talk, the latter is seen by them as an armchair jihadi who, when push came to shove, was not willing to support the jihad in Iraq.

Moreover, al-Maqdisi often stressed the need to set up an Islamic state, rather than just engaging in attacks without lasting results.

When IS came along, it seemed that a sustained effort to do what al-Maqdisi had always wanted – setting up an Islamic state – was finally being made, yet al-Maqdisi again refused to support it because he saw IS as the epitome of the “extremist” policies that he had always rejected.

To some supporters of al-Zarqawi, this was proof that al-Maqdisi was hypocritical and not supportive of Jihadi- Salafism.

To al-Maqdisi himself, however, the fall of IS is likely to be seen as proof that he was right all along.

Due to the extent of support for both positions, neither of these narratives is going to become entirely dominant in Jordan, with both co-existing uneasily for some years to come.

Dr Wagemakers’ research, at the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands, concentrates on Salafi ideology and groups, especially in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories.

Speech International Conference on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

Dutch AIVD Director of Intelligence Jack Twiss, 15 February 2017

Today I would like to tell you about a family that went to Syria. A mother and father, inspired by the proclamation of the ISIS caliphate. Perhaps they believe that it would be wonderful to raise their children in an Islamic utopia. They take their two children, close the door behind them, and leave.

After a long and arduous journey the family arrives in Syria. The father is immediately sent off to a training camp where he is trained in the use of weapons and combat.

After his training he is regularly sent to the front lines to fight. The mother and the two young children quickly find out that daily life with ISIS is tough. They find it hard to adjust to the bombing raids, to sharing a house with other families, to only a few hours of electricity a day. The mother finds herself pregnant and soon discovers that prenatal care is abominable. She wants to return to the Netherlands and she manages to convince her husband that they ought to flee. So, shortly before the father is sent to the front again they make their escape, cross the border into Turkey and eventually return to the Netherlands.

Upon their arrival the father and mother are arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organization. The children are taken to live with relatives. The father and mother are interrogated separately and they categorically deny having been members of ISIS. After a month the public prosecution service decides to release them for lack of evidence.

The family returns to their old neighbourhood.

This is one example of some of the stories that I deal with as director of intelligence with the General intelligence and security service – the AIVD. At this point in our story the AIVD faces a dilemma: the mother and father are disillusioned, yes, but have they also renounced their jihadist beliefs? Or will they continue to support the jihad in Syria but now from the Netherlands?

These are the questions that one of the teams of my service sets out to answer. As an intelligence and security service we are able to, and allowed to do a lot. We have a range of investigatory powers at our disposal, such as observation, house searches, wire taps, all under strict conditions.

But we are no mind readers. People who have something to hide are often highly security-conscious, and they try to deceive us. For example, what is it exactly that two returnees are talking about when one of them asks the other: “when does the game start?” Does this mean they are going to a football match together, or is it an attack plot they are discussing? We hear remarks such as these every day, and for every remark we have to assess if it constitutes a threat or not.

Similarly, for the family of four I described just now we have to take great care to see if they constitute a risk. Then we decide if it is necessary to keep a close watch on these persons, or whether they can reintegrate into our society.

In our publication ‘Focus on Returnees’, published today, we describe the threat. All returnees are reviewed by the AIVD to assess their potential threat. One of the criteria we look at is the length of stay in the conflict zone. Nearly all returnees coming back now have spent at least a year in the conflict zone. Many of them have gained combat experience and are deeply integrated into jihadist networks. Which means that they pose potentially a greater threat than the earlier returnees that spent less time in the conflict zone.

The reason why someone decides to return to the Netherlands also plays a role. This is not always clear: medical problems, homesickness or pressure from relatives, but also a sense of disillusion with life in the caliphate could be important. Being disillusioned, however, does not mean that radical ideas and violence have been renounced. For the most part disappointment with life in the conflict zone does not mean that people turn their backs on jihadist ideology.

Where there is no information on why someone returned, or there are indications that the returnees have been allowed to leave by ISIS, the AIVD will take into account these returnees may have been sent back to Europe with a specific assignment.

While the experiences of life in the caliphate are certainly part of the assessment of

the potential threat of returnees, even more important are our up-to-date knowledge

of and insight into their behaviour, beliefs and intentions.

Let’s go back to our recently returned family of four. They were in the conflict zone only a couple of months. Their main motivation for returning was the dire quality of life in the caliphate. But what does that imply in terms of their jihadist intentions? The mother has turned her back on ISIS, but the father still appears to be radicalised and to support the jihad, only now he is in the Netherlands.

It is not necessary, nor feasible for us to monitor each and every returnee twentyfour- seven. Fortunately the AIVD partners with a whole chain of organizations that play a part where returnees are concerned.

We strive to share our information on foreign fighters with the public prosecution service so that they can start their criminal investigation at an early stage. Returnees will initially be arrested and where possible prosecuted.

Returnees that are released are taken on by the social services of the local authorities in their place of residence. Signals coming from these municipal agencies and organizations are of great value to the AIVD in assessing whether someone is still harbouring radical ideas. Because, as I mentioned before, we cannot monitor each and every returnee day and night. The police also keep a watchful eye: local police officers know the local situation, know who is friendly with whom and who the jihadist instigators are.

 

 

They are in a perfect position to pick up signals at a local level and if necessary inform us. The AIVD then has the difficult task to assess in time if someone presents an actual danger or not.

The AIVD expects the number of returning jihadist to increase little by little in the future. Together they constitute a group that requires the close attention of all of us, because they are ideologically hardened, because they have combat experience and because they have become a part of a jihadist network. The AIVD does not expect all Dutch foreign fighters to return to our country. Some of them will remain in the region, and some will be killed in action. We should take care not to focus too much on returnees alone. If we look at the most recent attacks in Berlin and Nice the perpetrators weren’t returnees that had been trained in Syria or Iraq. There are homegrown jihadists that pursue the fight in their own country, often inspired by ISIS’ propaganda. Some individuals are actively, incited and facilitated by ISIS to spring into action. So we have several different scenarios to deal with.

Today’s publication discusses the threat posed by returnees. Unfortunately it does not offer any ready-made answers. The case of the family of returnees I used as an example today, shows that what is needed is the long-term investment of different agencies and organizations. Hopefully our publication offers you help, insight and suggestions. In addition to this publication I would like to leave you with these three points.

(1) Returnees are not all alike. Threat assessment has been and always will be ‘made-to-measure’. (2) We should work together to remain alert regarding the group of future returnees. Only by cooperating can we resist the potential threat they pose.

(3) The jihadist threat is a complicated matter. Homegrown jihadists are inspired or incited on by ISIS, and the risk they pose is as great as that of returnees.

 

General Intelligence and Security Service Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Says Antilleans in ISIS.

caribb-666229

The transformation of jihadism in the Netherlands Swarm dynamics and new strength.

 

 

Hard to count, hard to profile The true size of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands is difficult to assess. Not everyone openly propounds their ideology, it can sometimes be hard to distinguish between jihadists and non-violent Salafists and internet personalities may be misleading. One individual can assume multiple jihadist identities online, and some of those who espouse jihad on the internet shy away from it in real life. However, the AIVD estimates that there are several hundred core adherents in the Netherlands and a few thousand sympathisers. Moreover, the movement’s appeal to some is so strong that they evolve remarkably quickly from followers at home to hard-core fighters on the front line in Syria, where they are prepared to take part in atrocities such as summary executions, mass murder and the beheading of opponents.

It is impossible to present a standard profile of the “typical” Dutch jihadist, or of the “typical” Dutch fighter abroad. The movement’s members vary widely in age, ethnic origin, educational attainment, employment background and home situation. Although the majority are men, many are women. A large proportion are in their twenties or thirties, but plenty more are older or younger. Some are minors. Relatively speaking, Dutch Moroccans are overrepresented (the majority of those identified by the AIVD as Dutch fighters abroad are of Moroccan origin). But ethnic Dutch converts to Islam are also found in the ranks of the movement, as are people of Somali, Antillean, Afghan, Turkish and Kurdish origin. Some lack even a basic educational qualification; others are university students or graduates. Many are out of work and living on benefits, but others hold down a variety of jobs. Some come from radical families that share their jihadist ideology, others from secular or moderate homes.

The widely-held view that they tend to deradicalise once they marry and have children does not always hold true. Several of the fighters now in Syria are husbands and fathers, and some have even been joined there by their wives and children. That is in defiance of mainstream religious leaders, who stress that jihadist fighters are in breach of Islamic teachings in respect of family obligations – for example, a child’s duty to obey their parents and a parent’s responsibility for their children.

Syria and the Middle East reality foretold by General Wesley Clark.

The following is excerpted from an op ed that appeared in the London Times, September 4th, 2014 entitled:

“Strengthening the NATO Alliance”: “We will not waver in our determination to confront the Islamic State. If terrorists think we will weaken in the face of their threats they could not be more wrong.” (Barack Obama and David Cameron).

Obama and Cameron called on the Atlantic Alliance as well as the governments of the 28 NATO member states, to support the airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Not only alternative media and various progressive media outlets, have reported covert financial and military support to so called “moderate” rebels but the corporate media have reported, covert support since as far back as 2011. Reuters published a detailed two page newspaper report captioned (what follows are of course excerpted highlights): “How Syria policy stalled under the “analyst in chief”. “The bombing campaign which can last for years is a major course correction for a president, with a famously cautious foreign policy. Obama’s handling of Syria, the early about face the repetitive debates, the turnaround in September-is emblematic, say current and former top US officials, of his highly centralized, deliberative and often reactive foreign policy”. “ It became clear from the people very close to the president that he had deep, deep reservations about intervening in Syria”, this from Julianne Smith, who was deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden. Smith’s claim about Obama having “deep, deep”, reservations about Syria, only shows the particular posturing of Obama at that time, yet Obama knew all along even before he became President, that “official’, American foreign policy pertinent to the Middle East entailed in their words “We’re going to take out seven countries in five years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran”, the words in the preceding are a statement of an “official stance”, taken by many of the elite in the upper echelons of the US government apparatus.  Reuters reported in the same news report that: “They say Obama and his inner circle made three fundamental mistakes. The withdrawal of all American troops from neighboring Iraq and the lack of a major effort to arm Syria’s “moderate” rebels, they say, gave Islamic State leeway to spread. Internal debates focused on the costs of US intervention in Syria, while downplaying the risks of not intervening. And the White House underestimated the damage to US credibility caused by Obama’s making public threats to Assad and then failing to enforce them”. Leon Panetta former defense secretary and CIA director was quoted in the Reuters report from his memoir, “Worthy Battles”: “It was clear to me and many others, that withdrawing all our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding Iraq together”. Here Panetta and others clearly and publicly stated that, their desire was to engage in a protracted American led, military campaign in Iraq and Syria, and that Obama’s troop withdrawal was a “fundamental mistake”.

 

Even more damning than the preceding is the fact that US “top-officials”, in the Obama cabinet publicly admitted to “covert”, operations in Syria trapping themselves in a web of subterfuge and double-speak. To give substance to my claims here is the Reuters excerpt validating them: “By the fall of 2012, “covertly”arming Syria”s rebels had been accepted by Obama’s top three national security Cabinet members-Clinton, Panetta, and CIA chief David Petraeus-as the best way to slow radicalism in Syria”. Other just as devastating as the preceding admissions, and outright lies are revealed: “In August 2011, Obama issued a 620-word statement on Syria that his aides hoped would put him on the right side of history. “It is time for the Syrian people to determine their own destiny”, Obama said. “Ford (the same Robert Ford shown earlier with Okaidi), ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014, said he supported the statement, but now regrets it because Washington didn’t back up the words with action”. When Assad refused to relinquish power it became clear that the administration and its allies lacked a plan or the political will to forcibly remove him. American and European credibility in the region suffered. Taking the removal of Assad into their own hands, Turkey and other Arab states overtly backed-or turned a blind eye to the entrance of jihadist groups into Syria. Three senior advisors outside the White House- Clinton, Panetta and Petraeus-proposed that the CIA train and equip the “relatively moderate Syrian rebels” operating as the Free Syrian the Free Syrian Army was warning- and US officials confirmed “independently”, that militant groups were luring away fighters with cash. The more ‘Western- Army (out of whose ranks many absconded to ISIS). At about that time Ford said, friendly “rebels had few funds to counter with. Here again devastating evidence of America and her proxies, funding and supporting “militant armed groups”, as a means of toppling the Asad regime, and that from a corporate media outlet like Reuters. It gets even worse as I will prove in the following from the mouth of a retired-US highly decorated general and frequent FOX contributor.

The story is from Democracy Now and was posted on 2nd March 2007. Amy Goodman conducted the interview I will include some of the questions and answers here which will prove some of my assertions made in this book.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a replay in what happened in the lead-up to the war with Iraq — the allegations of the weapons of mass destruction, the media leaping onto the bandwagon?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, in a way. But, you know, history doesn’t repeat itself exactly twice. What I did warn about when I testified in front of Congress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a state, it shouldn’t be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our administration, wanted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.

I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decision we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.”

“So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” — meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office (Donald Rumsfeld was then Secretary of Defense), “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it classified?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, “You remember that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!”

AMY GOODMAN: So, go through the countries again.

 

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, starting with Iraq, then Syria and Lebanon, then Libya, then Somalia and Sudan, and back to Iran. So when you look at Iran, you say, “Is it a replay?” It’s not exactly a replay. But here’s the truth: that Iran, from the beginning, has seen that the presence of the United States in Iraq was a threat — a blessing, because we took out Saddam Hussein and the Baathists. They couldn’t handle them. We took care of it for them. But also a threat, because they knew that they were next on the hit list. And so, of course, they got engaged. They lost a million people during the war with Iraq, and they’ve got a long and unprotectable, unsecurable border. So it was in their vital interest to be deeply involved inside Iraq. They tolerated our attacks on the Baathists. They were happy we captured Saddam Hussein.

But they’re building up their own network of influence, and to cement it, they occasionally give some military assistance and training and advice, either directly or indirectly, to both the insurgents and to the militias. And in that sense, it’s not exactly parallel, because there has been, I believe, continuous Iranian engagement, some of it legitimate, some of it illegitimate. I mean, you can hardly fault Iran because they’re offering to do eye operations for Iraqis who need medical attention. That’s not an offense that you can go to war over, perhaps. But it is an effort to gain influence.

And the administration has stubbornly refused to talk with Iran about their perception, in part because they don’t want to pay the price with their domestic — our US domestic political base, the rightwing base, but also because they don’t want to legitimate a government that they’ve been trying to overthrow. If you were Iran, you’d probably believe that you were mostly already at war with the United States anyway, since we’ve asserted that their government needs regime change, and we’ve asked congress to appropriate $75 million to do it, and we are supporting terrorist groups, apparently, who are infiltrating and blowing up things inside Iraq — Iran. And if we’re not doing it, let’s put it this way: we’re probably cognizant of it and encouraging it. So it’s not surprising that we’re moving to a point of confrontation and crisis with Iran.

AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to get your response to Seymour Hersh’s piece in The New Yorker to two key points this week, reporting the Pentagon’s established a special planning group within the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan a bombing attack on Iran, that this is coming as the Bush administration and Saudi Arabia are pumping money for covert operations into many areas of the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, in an effort to strengthen Saudi-supported Sunni Islam groups and weaken Iranian-backed Shias — some of the covert money has been given to jihadist groups in Lebanon with ties to al-Qaeda — fighting the Shias by funding with Prince Bandar and then with US money not approved by Congress, funding the Sunnis connected to al-Qaeda.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, I don’t have any direct information to confirm it or deny it. It’s certainly plausible. The Saudis have taken a more active role. You know, the Saudis have –

AMY GOODMAN: You were just in Saudi Arabia.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Hmm?

AMY GOODMAN: You just came back from Saudi Arabia.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Yeah. Well, the Saudis have basically recognized that they have an enormous stake in the outcome in Iraq, and they don’t particularly trust the judgment of the United States in this area. We haven’t exactly proved our competence in Iraq. So they’re trying to take matters into their own hands.

The real danger is, and one of the reasons this is so complicated is because — let’s say we did follow the desires of some people who say, “Just pull out, and pull out now.” Well, yeah. We could mechanically do that. It would be ugly, and it might take three or four months, but you could line up the battalions on the road one by one, and you could put the gunners in the Humvees and load and cock their weapons and shoot their way out of Iraq. You’d have a few roadside bombs. But if you line everybody up there won’t be any roadside bombs. Maybe some sniping. You can fly helicopters over, do your air cover. You’d probably get safely out of there. But when you leave, the Saudis have got to find someone to fight the Shias. Who are they going to find? Al-Qaeda, because the groups of Sunnis who would be extremists and willing to fight would probably be the groups connected to al-Qaeda. So one of the weird inconsistencies in this is that were we to get out early, we’d be intensifying the threat against us of a super powerful Sunni extremist group, which was now legitimated by overt Saudi funding in an effort to hang onto a toehold inside Iraq and block Iranian expansionism.

AMY GOODMAN: And interestingly, today, John Negroponte has just become the number two man, resigning his post as National Intelligence Director to go to the State Department, Seymour Hersh says, because of his discomfort that the administration’s covert actions in the Middle East so closely echo the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s, and Negroponte was involved with that.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, I’m sure there are a lot of reasons why John would go back to the State Department. John’s a good — he’s a good man. But, you know, the question is, in government is, can you — are you bigger than your job? Because if you’re not bigger than your job, you get trapped by the pressures of events and processes into going along with actions that you know you shouldn’t. And I don’t know. I don’t know why he left the National Intelligence Director’s position. He started in the State Department. Maybe he’s got a fondness to return and finish off his career in State.

 

AMY GOODMAN: 1953 was also a seminal date for today, and that was when Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, went to Iran and led a coup against Mohammed Mossadegh under Eisenhower.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: People make mistakes. And one of the mistakes that the United States consistently made was that it could intervene and somehow adjust people’s governments, especially in the Middle East. I don’t know why we felt that — you can understand Latin America, because Latin America was always an area in which people would come to the United States, say, “You’ve got to help us down there. These are banditos, and they don’t know anything. And, you know, they don’t have a government. Just intervene and save our property.” And the United States did it a lot in the ’20s. Of course, Eisenhower was part of that culture. He had seen it.

But in the Middle East, we had never been there. We established a relationship during World War II, of course, to keep the Germans out of Iran. And so, the Soviets and the Brits put an Allied mission together. At the end of World War II, the Soviets didn’t want to withdraw, and Truman called their bluff in the United Nations. And Eisenhower knew all of this. And Iran somehow became incorporated into the American defense perimeter. And so, his view would have been, we couldn’t allow a communist to take over.

AMY GOODMAN: But wasn’t it more about British Petroleum?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Oh, it’s always — there are always interests. The truth is, about the Middle East is, had there been no oil there, it would be like Africa. Nobody is threatening to intervene in Africa. The problem is the opposite. We keep asking for people to intervene and stop it. There’s no question that the presence of petroleum throughout the region has sparked great power involvement. Whether that was the specific motivation for the coup or not, I can’t tell you. But there was definitely — there’s always been this attitude that somehow we could intervene and use force in the region. I mean that was true with — I mean, imagine us arming and creating the Mujahideen to keep the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Why would we think we could do that? But we did. And, you know, my lesson on it is, whenever you use force, there are unintended consequences, so you should use force as a last resort. Whether it’s overt or covert, you pay enormous consequences for using force.

John Negroponte was mentioned in the interview excerpted above who is John Negroponte?

Negroponte is a 1980’s US ambassador to Honduras, who has been accussed by many writers and progressive/alternative media of being  a “death squad specialist” . A revealing article by Patrick Henningsen, Global Research , November 02,2014, Negroponte above center is described as a death squad specialist. In the 1980’s Negroponte according to Henningsen was Washington’s man in Latin America who controlled the CIA-backed Contra rebels. “Through cocaine and narcotics trafficking, these paramilitary gangs were also able to fund their conquest to destabilize and terrorize Nicaraguans. So, it was no surprise when Negroponte showed up as US Ambassador in Baghdad, Iraq in 2004, that Islamic death squads began appearing in Iraq featuring some of the most brutal sectarian violence to date. The article went even further and accussed , Robert S. Ford US ambassador to Syria, of being the instrument of the US in facilitating the attacks of the “peaceful protesters”, against the Syrian regime: “Soon after Ford’s arrival, western-backed Flash Mobs and targeted violence against Syrian police and military – erupted in parts of Syria.The war in Syria at present is not limited to Syria, it will encompass  the broader Middle East Central Asian region extending from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border with China, will be engulfed in the turmoil of an extended war. A war on Syria could evolve towards a US-NATO military campaign directed against Iran, in which Turkey and Israel would be directly involved. John Negroponte mentioned previously is a name not often heard, in the corporate media, yet he remains a highly divisive figure, if the various media are to be believed, Negroponte is a dangerous individual, who should be imprisoned not running around the world organizing ‘death squads”, I will examine Negroponte even further here, since any reportage on Syria, even one of minimal depth will at some point involve, an analysis of Negroponte in the context, of the architects of the present war in Syria. As I have shown earlier in this book, war in Syria and the wider Middle East was already “in the pipeline”, since the 1990’s the present US engineered war in Syria, then is part of said agenda and it’s architects are the “top people”, in the US military and intelligence apparatus respectively.