Category Archives: politics

An Historical Perspective on the Unrest in Ethiopia.

From the book Rastafari and its Shamanist Origins.

The Dirge was a committee of low ranked, officers and enlisted men that was established, to investigate the military’s demands, for higher wages etc. The troops of the Dirge confronted H.I.M. in his office in the Jubilee Palace (the same office shown previously in this book). What follows is quoted from Harold G. Marcus’ A History of Ethiopia : ‘The next day, with Addis Ababa cut off from the world and under curfew, a small group of officers went to the palace and, at 6:00 A.M ., summoned Haile Sellassie. He appeared in full uniform and, with great dignity, stood proud and erect while a nervous officer read out a proclamation of deposition. The old man declared his acceptance, if it were for the good of the people, and he was escorted outside, where an awaiting vehicle and small escort took him to Fourth Division Headquarters. Within the hour, Radio Addis Abeba reported that Ethiopia had been freed from Haile Sellassie’s oppression by a Provisional Military, Administration Council (PMAC)—the descendants of the Coordinating Committee, that had abolished parliament and suspended the constitution’.  Kapuscinski gave a vivid account as told to him by Sellassie’s manservant worthy of re-enactment here: ‘At the end of August, the military proclaimed the nationalization of all the Emperor’s Palaces. There were fifteen of them. His private enterprises met the same fate, among them the Saint George Brewery, the Addis Ababa metropolitan bus company, the mineral-water factory in Ambo. The exact sum of the Emperor’s accounts will probably never be known. The propaganda bulletins spoke of four billion dollars. At daybreak, the soldiers came for H.I.M: “His Imperial Majesty will please follow us. Where to? H.S. asked, to a safe place, explained the major. Everybody left the Palace, in the driveway stood a green Volkswagen. You cannot be serious the Emperor bridled I am supposed to go like this? However, he presently fell silent and sat down in the back seat of the car. The Volkswagen set off followed by a jeep full of armed soldiers. I want to reconstruct the socio-political and highlight some geo-political events that led to the fall, arrest, and subsequent death of Haile Sellassie I. Here I will begin from the interim of the Italian slaughter on the Ethiopians in Addis Ababa and its outlying villages (The Graziani Massacre), By 1937 it was increasingly clear that the terrorist tactics and policies of the Italian governments vis a vis Ethiopians, only worked to harden the resolve of Ethiopians against Italian occupation, delayed development and settlement projects, and raised the costs of Italian security within Ethiopia. Resultantly Italy recalled Graziani, replacing him with the Duke of Aosta, a civilian in 1942. In southern and eastern Ethiopia, Aosta implemented the well-worn strategy of divide and conquer,  favored by European colonial-imperialist powers, dividing the Christian insurgents battling Italian occupation, from the Muslim population in the area.

The enmity between the varying ethnic groups in Ethiopia was lit aflame when the Italians, reorganized their stolen territories (colonies) in east Africa, Tigray in Eritrea, Italy then placed Ogaden in Somalia, then went on to divide the rest of the country into Galla and Sidama, Hater, Shoa, and Amara. Thereby attempting to eliminate the historical and cultural links of the people. In September 1939, world war II was underway, this was a boon for the Ethiopians, changing the geopolitical reality in favour of the Ethiopians. The Ethiopian insurgents and patriots increased their attacks on Italians and their interests in Ethiopia. One famous Ethiopian freedom fighter and a masterful tactician was, Dejazmatch Abebe Aregai, who was once the police chief of Addis Ababa. On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on the allied powers, Haile Sellassie’s continuous appeals for assistance were finally heeded, by Britain. On 12 July 1940, London acquiesced and officially declared, Ethiopia (Haile Sellassie), as an ally. Two weeks later Haile Sellassie, was in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, the Sudanese army comprising roughly 2500 men, was no match for the 250,000 Italian troops and 200 warplanes. The British began training an Ethiopian force, to invade Gojam from Sudan ultimately joining up with the Ethiopian freedom fighters inside the country. The commander of the Ethiopian fighters was, Major Charles Wingate who trained the Ethiopian forces, thereby aiding them in becoming a highly disciplined well-trained unit.

The Ethiopian fighting force consisted of Ethiopian exiles, some European mercenaries, and Sudanese soldiers, the unit was called Gideon Force.  Haile Sellassie along with his fighters and Wingate entered Gojam on 20 January 1941. Upon seeing the fighters of Gideon force, the Italians who vastly outnumbered them fled for their lives, seeking shelter in their fortresses. The victorious Ethiopian soldiers from Gideon force rendezvoused, with the remnants of the Ethiopian freedom fighters, already there, atse (Emperor) Haile Sellassie II was thunderously welcomed by the freedom fighters in Gojam. On 5 May 1941, Haile Sellassie returned triumphantly to Addis Ababa, five years after the arrival of Badoglio, restoring Ethiopia’s freedom. H.I.M immediately moved to mitigate and eventually remove British influence by, acquiring non-British advisers, ending London’s control over Ethiopia’s finances and customs, and bringing to a close the British military monopoly in Dire Dawa, Ogaden, and along the national railway line. The prescient Sellassie, being a voracious student of history, foresaw that America then ascendant would become a global superpower, therefore he strategically aligned himself with the Americans.

The American consul in Eritrea, where the Americans had seized various Italian bases as, assembly points and distribution centers for lend-lease in the Middle East, aided Sellassie in his struggle to remove British political and economic hegemony from his nation. At Washington’s behest, Ethiopia became a member state of the fledgling United Nations, re-opening its embassy in Addis Ababa in 1943, gave arms and ammunition to Ethiopia, and sent a technical and advisory team, to report back to Washington on Ethiopia’s needs. Haile Sellassie I, recreated the pre-war economy and political structure, staffing the top positions with bureaucrats.  In 1944, the corporation turned a profit of 1.2 million and 1.8 million pounds respectively, double the standard margin for the majority of businesses in Ethiopia at the time. Haile Sellassie’s huge popularity amongst black western populations was also reflected in the enthusiastic support he received amongst African Americans, this support translated to the large number of African Americans enlisting in the US Army, to fight alongside the allies, this also meant they would get an opportunity to fight against Mussolini’s forces who were seen as devils incarnate.  The US State Department chaired a meeting on 13 February 1945, between Haile Sellassie I and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Egypt. The program that Haile Selassie I presented to Roosevelt contained Ethiopia’s foreign policy goals at the time. And are as follows Ethiopian ownership over the railway to Djibouti, free and unimpeded access to the sea, recovery of Eritrea, reparations from Italy, assistance in developing a modern army, US investments in development.

At the same time London wanted to retain Ogaden as part of Greater Somalia, the Ethiopians recognized that such a move was detrimental to their interest’s and vociferously made their objections known to the British. Meanwhile the nationalist Somalia Youth League (SYL), was agitating for uniting all Somalians in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti into one ethnic state. By 1947, most Somalian policemen, soldiers, and officials were members of the (SYL), the Ogaden was being run by the afore mentioned at the behest of the British. Ethiopia determined to regain Ogaden, used the exploratory drilling of the American Sinclair Oil Company as a pretext to regain control of Ogaden. Ethiopia granted the American personnel of the company Sinclair Oil, one-year visas to work in Ogaden. Resultantly the Jijiga (SYL), condemned the move denouncing Ethiopia as illegitimate, claiming Ethiopia had no right to rule in Ogaden. When an international commission arrived in Mogadishu (1948), ostensibly to seek advice on Somalia’s post war disposition, (SYL) activist’s claimed Sinclair, was in Somalia illegally, (SYL) members then assaulted a Sinclair drilling team. The British commanding officer responsible for the gendarmerie was powerless, to intervene since the gendarmerie consisted of SYL members.  On 17 March 1948, the Ethiopians announced that British troops would shortly be withdrawn from Jijiga. The Ethiopian government thereafter established a new administration for, Ogaden which went into effect at the end of September. Haile Sellassie then turned his attention to, restoring Eritrea as part of Ethiopia. Eritrea then was governed by a British military administration, Haile Sellassie I argued that Eritrea prior to being colonized was a part of Ethiopia.

The seminal event that led to the fall of the regime of Haile Sellassie, was the famine that killed tens of thousands, in north-eastern Ethiopia mainly in the Wollo province and Tigray. A 1973 production by ITV entitled; ‘The Unknown Famine’ later reworked and retitled The Hidden Hunger by a group of army officers, who were plotting to seize power. The film juxtaposed footage of Haile Sellassie eating at a banquet in one of his palaces, with those of starving Ethiopians, the film portrayed a disproportionate image of massive death and untold misery. Although there were many deaths from starvation, the propagandist’s inflated the numbers. The famine, high oil prices, military mutinies all were contributing factors in the destabilization of the regime of Haile Sellassie. Edmund J. Keller in his book ‘Ethiopia: Revolution, Class and the National Question’, published by African Affairs (1981): wrote the following; ‘Peasants and pastoralists living on the margins of subsistence have had to cope with such phenomena from time immemorial. As a result of the process of modernization and the centralization efforts of the state, however, the lives of poor rural inhabitants had been unalterably changed. More and more of their surplus production has either been demanded by landlords and the state or been translated into cars in order [sic] to meet tax obligations. Conservatives and Liberal Reforms, 1960–1974 113 their freedom of movement and their access to land was also now inhibited by state regulation or by a complex and aggressive burgeoning market economy. Traditional survival mechanisms were either gravely weakened or completely inoperable. Rural people unwittingly had become extremely dependent on the state. For its part, the state was more concerned with economic growth and political survival than it was with meeting its inherited social responsibilities’.

The preceding ably gives the reader an understanding of some of the actual causes, why the peasants who were in the majority in Ethiopia and lived mainly in rural areas, were mobilized by those opposed to Haile Sellassie, to rise up against the government. The regions of Wolle and Tigray which supplied 40 percent of Ethiopia’s total food production at the time, were estimated to have lost about 20 percent of their human populations and 90 percent of their animals. Students and various citizen groups began food distribution campaigns. In 1973, students at the Haile Sellassie I University began a series of student protests on campus, that led to the arrests and subsequent deaths of some students. The protests were sparked by the famine in northern Ethiopia and in the low-lying areas (lowlands), of Harerge, Bale, Sidamo, and Gamo Gofa. In 1973, the peasants unable to sustain themselves, sold off their grain to purchase food, with some eating seed grain. Starving, many of them made their way to the towns, hoping to receive government aid. The provincial administrators underreported the true proportions of the crisis, in Addis Ababa officials at the outset denied the existence of the famine, not even bothering to report the existence of the crisis to Haile Selassie I. Intellectuals and students criticized the regime. The government promptly reacted, by banning all news of the famine, the official government stance was denial, till May 1973. The government was forced to admit the existence of the famine, when an ad hoc committee of professors from the Haile Sellassie I University professors traveled to Welo in 1973, returning with photos backed by a devastating report describing the horrendous reality of the residents, who were dying of starvation.  

In response to the criticism, the government established an emergency committee, which tried maintaining the crisis by internal resource mobilization. The Ethiopian government relief efforts were thwarted by a multiplicity of causes some of which were, nepotism, corruption, profiteering, the refusal of local and provincial governments to waive taxes and the inability to divert grain exports to relief agencies. International reporting painting an accurate picture of the debilitating famine in Ethiopia, the agonizing images of starving, dying babies with distended stomachs, flies on their bodies with their parents lying next to them, shocked the world. Those horrific images spurred a relief effort led by wealthy western nations’ governments, the effort eventually included relief organizations, NGOs, churches, students, universities, and academics mainly in the western hemisphere. In 1974 two related economic crises wreaked havoc on the global economy, particularly in developing countries, Ethiopia was amongst the worst hit, the primary crisis stemmed from the high cost of petroleum products caused by the closure of the Suez Canal, secondly, the high cost of finished goods and food, which rose by 20 and 80 percent respectively. Due to the massive unrest caused by students stoning vehicles in the streets and other riotous behavior, the military was authorized to quell the rebellion.

On February 23, Haile Sellassie toured the marketplace in Addis Ababa, speaking with people urging them to remain calm, meeting with the common people and vendors, in this manner Sellassie was able to diffuse the growing tension. He appeared on Ethiopian television that evening again urging calm, he announced that the military would, deal severely with cases of civil disturbance. On Monday 25 1974, Addis Ababa, experienced a scene of calm, which only presaged the coming storm of military unrest, that led to the overthrew of the Haile Sellassie I monarchial government. The Ethiopian Herald carried this brief message on August 28, 1975: ‘Yesterday Haile Sellassie I, the former Emperor of Ethiopia, died. The cause of death was circulatory failure’. The continued existence of Ethiopia as a unified nation-state is threatened, by the intra-ethnic and ethnic, strife that has characterized Ethiopia for thousands of years. Where will the Rastafari of the west, fit into the Ethiopia of the future? Even in Haile Sellassie’s Ethiopia ethnic strife was commonplace, as I have shown in this work, the pro-Amhara Sellassie regime killed other ethnic groups, like Ethiopian regimes past and present. Can Ethiopia transcend its, self-destructive ethnic divide? The future prognosis on Ethiopian ethnic unity is dismal indeed. Ethiopia’s political history is replete with examples, of ethnically motivated dissent.  At the center of the dissent in Ethiopia, the Oromo are often, the most severely affected group. The recent murder of Hachalu Hundesa 34, an Oromo musician known for his anti-government pro-Oromo music, and his support for the Oromia liberation movement. Hachalu was shot on Monday 29, June 2020, in an Addis Ababa suburb, he succumbed in a hospital, later of gunshot wounds. Later that same day, in Adama a town situated in the Oromia region, several people were killed during protests. The Ethiopian government has repeatedly denied, allegations by, local human rights groups and international organizations of torture, mass incarcerations, and extra-judicial killings.

In 1991, the Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam was defeated by the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the succeeding political framework was and still is that of a, a federation of nine ethnically diverse states. Meles Zenawi the leader of the TPLF, became the President of Ethiopia, the now-deceased Zenawi (2012), was succeeded by Haile Mariam Desalegn, after 21 years as leader. Opposition figures accused Zenawi of being an authoritarian leader, Zenawi’s TPLF, became Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Ethiopia’s governance system is fraught with many challenges, foremost of them being its pseudo-democratic system, which often sees one party and its allies winning all the 547 parliamentary seats, not because of any overwhelming support, since the varying ethnic groups in Ethiopia would never all support one party. The mere fact that anyone party would win all 547 seats in ethnically diverse Ethiopia, points to the endemic corruption at the state level in Ethiopia. The EPRDF also controls the state security apparatus, the police, military, and all intelligence-gathering units, all are staffed and dominated by Tigrayans. The government’s bogus anti-terrorism laws are another tool used as a pretext to arrest anyone opposed to the regime, such as bloggers, journalists, opposition figures, human rights groups, and environmental activists.

 A report published in 2009, by AHR, Advocates for Human Rights, documented systemic abuse, by three successive Ethiopian governments against the Oromo, those governments are the following, the Haile Sellassie regime, the Marxist government led by Haile Mengistu, and the present EPRDF government first led by the now-deceased Meles Zenawi (Tigrayan), then led by his chosen successor Haile Desalegn, and now led by Abiy Ahmed. The report by the AHR comprising 166 pages, documented that between 2011 and 2014 at least 5000 ‘based on their actual or suspected peaceful opposition to the government’. Dissenters both actual and suspected had been ‘detained without charge or trial and killed by security services during protests, arrests and in detention’. In the Ogaden the situation is even more deplorable, comprising mainly ethnic Somalis the Ogaden, is an underdeveloped expanse of land containing rich oil and gas deposits, those living there have consistently accused the Ethiopian government of systemic abuses such as forced displacements from ancestral lands, forced removal of large groups to camps, starvations and massacres of civilians, the persons in the camps dependent on the Ethiopian government for food and water, are routinely starved with some dying from food and water deprivation. Rape and intimidation are routinely used by security forces as means of keeping, civilians in line, whose land was taken away by the Ethiopian government and given to Chinese consortiums who own gas and oil projects in the region. The Anuak in the Gambella (a resource-rich region in the west of Ethiopia bordering Sudan), also accused the Ethiopian government of crimes against them such as forced removal from their lands and massacres by the highlanders. The people assert that they do not benefit from, the oil and agricultural projects the government has leased to foreign interests. The Anuak a dark-hued African people, who have been treated as inferiors by the dominant Tigrayan and Amhara groups, since ancient times are discriminated against based on their ethnicity. The convulsive ethnic strife’s, which cause enormous societal rifts and eruptions, threatens the very existence of Ethiopia as a heterogeneous nation-state, as the Ethiopian historical and contemporaneous accounts have shown, throughout this work,   if state actors in Ethiopia, do not cease from ruling from an approach of repression, nepotism, genocidal policies, and ethnic favoritism, it is only a matter of time before what occurred in Rwanda repeats itself in Ethiopia.  The total dehumanization and wanton killing of the African that was justifiable by law in the above countries mentioned was unparalleled in their scope and their ability to allow mass mayhem to be perpetrated on the Africans who were in many cases utterly defenceless in the face of their own extinction. The task then of any honest scholar claiming to be a scholar of conscience or merit must of necessity be to construct a historical narrative that leads to a reconciliatory spirit between the past and present generations of Africans in continental Africa and their descendants.

The Armenian Massacre 2. The Continuation.

The outbreak of fighting in Nagorno Karabakh between the Armenians and Azerbaijani’s, are embers of an age-old conflict between the Armenians who are traditionally ‘Christian’, and the Azerbaijani’s who are traditionally adhere to the Islamic creed i.e. Muslims. The massacre and deportation of Turkey’s Armenian population took place against a background of fighting between Turkish and Russian forces, on the Caucasus front. It was described by some scholars, as the first genocide of the 20th century.

This post will focus on the events and socio-political, socio-cultural religious and ethnic differences that shaped, the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict, making both ethnic groups the arch enemies that they are today.

Russia and Ottoman Turkey were multinational empires. Where their borders met in the Caucasus Armenians lived on both sides.

Armenian Nationalism: The Christian Armenians and their Turkish Muslim rulers in Turkey, had a history of conflict stretching back centuries. In the 1890’s Armenian nationalist agitation, served as a pretext for the Turks to slaughter thousands of Armenians. In August 1914, the Turkish government asked Armenian envoys gathered at Erzurum in eastern Turkey, to incite rebellion against Russian hegemony in the Caucasus. The Armenian refused, when Turkey entered World War I, the Caucasus and western Anatolia were turned into war zones. During Turkey’s ill-fated offensive in the winter of 1915, Armenians fought as conscripts in the Turkish and the Russian army. The Russian army also contained Armenians fighting, for liberation from Turkish rule.  Russia encouraged an Armenian revolt against Turkey, likewise the Turks incentivized and fomented an uprising by Turkic peoples and Muslim Kurds living in Russia. The Turkish army was roundly defeated at the Caucasus front at Sarikamish between December 1914 and January 1915.

Ethnic Tensions: The situation in eastern Anatolia was unstable, ethnic tensions were acute. The majority of the population consisted of Muslims, who were displaced from the Russian ruled Caucasus in the 19th century and bitterly resented, the Christian pro-Russian Armenians.

  1. This post will be continued, the continuation will highlight the Armenian Genocide.
  2. It will highlight the history of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
  3. It will highlight the 1990’s situation in Nagorno Karabakh and will touch on the current situation in Nagorno Karabakh.      

This is the continuation of the post: The Armenian Massacre.

Mass Deportations: On 24 April as the allies were beginning their landings at Gallipoli, the Interior Minister of Turkey Talaat Pasha, ordered the arrest of about 250 members of the Armenian urban elite, living in Constantinople. Turkey viewed the Armenians as an enemy within. More mass arrest’s followed with hundreds more prominent Armenians being detained. The Techir, deportation law authorized Turkish authorities, to engage in the arrest and mass deportation, of Armenians from Anatolia. During the mass deportations more than 600,000 Armenians died, the deportations were executed in a brutal and callused manner, resulting in a massive Armenian death toll. It should be noted that the Turks were and still are Muslims, and Armenians then and now are Christian. The typical clearance of an Armenian village by the Turkish military, began with the brutal slaughter of the male population, the deportees were force marched on the roads to Iraq and Syria. The deportees on the roads usually consisted of mainly of women young and old, as well as children. The deportees were not given an opportunity, to prepare most went on the forced marches, with the clothes on their backs and no food and water. Underway the defenceless Armenians were attacked by their primary nemesis the Kurds. Many Armenians from dehydration. For those who managed to reach the dismal camps in Syria and Iraq, their fate was even worse, they often died a slow and painful death, from starvation, disease, and the extremely harsh circumstances they were living in.

By 1916, the Russians under the command of General Nikolai Yudenich went on the offensive, in Anatolia (Turkey), capturing the fortress town of Erzurum and the port of Trabzon in February of 1916, by then the area’s Armenian population had been annihilated.

The war today being fought by Armenia and Azerbaijan is as a direct result of the many unrequited atrocities, perpetrated by both groups throughout, the years one against the other.

Ethiopia Birthplace of The Human Race.

Excerpted from Rastafari and its Shamanist Origins by Wade A. Bailey.

Ethiopia’s bedrock belongs to the earth’s first continent, a continent called Gondwanaland by geologists, of which Africa forms the last intact remnant. The structures of this 600-million-year-old land made up of hard, massive folded pre-Cambrian crystalline rock, have been covered over throughout most of Ethiopia by recent formations. Ethiopia is called the cradle of mankind, by some geologist’s and anthropologists. The Bible records in Genesis 2:8-14 that: ‘And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed 10 And a river went out of Eden to water the garden, and from thence it was parted into four heads. 11 The name of the first is Pison, that is it which compasseth the whole land of Havilah where there is gold. 12 And the gold of that land is good there is Bedellium and the Onyx stone. 13 And the name of the second is Gihon (Blue Nile) the same is it that compasseth the whole land of Ethiopia. 14 And the name of the third river is Hiddekel that is it which goeth toward the east of Assyria and the fourth river is Euphrates. As per the biblical description Eden was a huge land mass and the river that flowed out of it, straddled more than one country, Ethiopia is one that was specifically named as being completely surrounded by one of the rivers namely Gihon (Blue Nile), judging from the biblical description the Garden of Eden is placed on the African continent, interestingly said placement is in agreement with ,scientific, archaeological, historical references and evidence.   

Here we have a visual map aide showing the proximity of Arab countries to Africa, it is from those countries, that Cannabis was introduced into the continent. Ethiopia is located in the northeast region of Africa, the ‘Horn’, of Africa so called because of the horn shaped tip of the continent, that demarcates the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia is bordered by Sudan on its western border Somalia to the southeast, Kenya to the south, Djibouti to the east, and Eritrea

to the north and northeast. Ethiopia consists of four major river systems the first system consists of the Takaze also known as the Atbara, the Abbay or the Blue Nile, lastly the Baro originating in Sudan, then flowing westward into the Nile.   

According to the officially available figures Ethiopia’s population is about 76 million people, it is the third most populous nation in Africa. The varying ethnicities that comprise Ethiopia’s populace is diverse and are grouped as follows, the Amhara and Tigrinya 32 percent, the Oromo 40 percent, Sidamo 9 percent, Somali’s 6 percent, Shankella 6 percent, Gurage 2 percent, Afar 4 percent. There are hundreds of languages spoken in Ethiopia that fall into four major categories. Three of which have a common ancestry that is called proto-Afroasiatic by linguists (Afro-Asiatic is Hamitic-Semetic). The three are known as Cushitic, Omotic and Semitic. Harold G. Marcus wrote in his seminal work; A History of Ethiopia published by University of California, that: ‘Evidence is strong that the Afro-Asiatic (Hamitic-Semitic) group of languages developed and fissured in the Sudan-Ethiopian borderlands. There Proto-Cushitic. and Proto-Semitic began their evolution. In Ethiopia, the Semitic branch grew into a northern group, today echoed in Tigrinya, and a southern group, best heard in Amharic. It simultaneously spread to the Middle East, whence, millennia later, it returned in a written form to enrich its cousins several times removed’. Cushitic includes the Agaw, the Somali, the Afar, the Saho, the Hadiya, the Kambata, the Oromo and the Gedeo. Omotic, the term Omotic is derived from the fact that the people thus designated traditionally lived on both sides of the Omo river. The following nationalities comprise the Omotic, the Dorze, Janjaro, Maji, Kafa, Waylata and the Dizi. The last category is the Semetic Geez is the oldest Semitic language spoken in Ethiopia, it is largely confined to the religious sphere i.e. sacral literature and theology. Other Semetic languages are, Amharic, Tegra, Harari and Gurage. There is the Nilo-Saharan language groups, which are not connected to the Cushitic, Omotic and Semetic language groups previously cited, they are as follows the Anuak, the Nuer, the Kunama southwestern Eritrea, the Gumuz in western Gojam and the Manjanjir. Linguistic and archeological evidence point to a prehistoric genesis for Ethiopian culture. Early evidence of human existence has been found in the varied array of stone tools, found in many parts of Ethiopia. Village farming was developed in Ethiopia during the Neolithic period. There is empirical evidence that Stone Age culture endured in Ethiopia, during different epochs. The Watta of Ethiopia were related to the hunting groups of northeastern and eastern Africa. The Agau are an early population who still exist today in Ethiopia. The Agau discovered new strains of plants, the domestication of the donkey and mule breeding regionally. The plateau peoples are grouped into three groups, linguistically and anthropologically, they are referred to as the Central Agau, and western and eastern Cushite’s. During the second Millennium the population increased dramatically, resultantly the Cushitic population who lived in the southern fringes expanded into Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. The migrations of the Bantu’s into Ethiopia changed the population dynamics in Ethiopia and all other southern African societies. Along with the afore mentioned and the erection of the phallic stones in southern Ethiopia, the basis for the development of states in Ethiopia were established. The development of city states in Ethiopia were spurned by various socio-religious dynamics and the intra-personal relationships of the various people groups vis a vis their counterparts. One of the ethnicities in Ethiopia credited with helping advance the proto-city state, to the contemporary city state are the Oromo. The Oromo, lived in the Ethiopian highlands in areas like Bali, the borders of what is now the Republic of Somalia. They claim to have emerged from the Borana region of southwestern Ethiopia. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, powerful Abyssinian kings by force of arms, made the Oromo move west and southwest into the barely habitable, saltpans, lava fields and toward the boulder and sand deserts near Lake Rudolph. Some Oromo groups over time developed powerful monarchial states. The Oromo are notable for their martial feats specifically as cavalry (mounted soldiers), ancient Ethiopian literature is replete with mention of or praises to the Oromo for their exploits on the battlefield. In 1776 civil war ushered in the era of the ‘age of princes’, the war and political intrigues persisted till 1855. The civil war ultimately resulted in the proto provincialism that is prevalent even today, resultantly the various provinces competed for territory and resources against the other provinces in a struggle for ultimate hegemony. The period saw the ascendency of various provincial dynasties, each province was demarcated along ethnic and national lines, the loyalty of the people was not to Ethiopia, but to their provinces and their kings who ruled over them. The Gondar monarchy’s decline led to an increase in the influence of the Galla. Gondar was once Ethiopia’s largest city, and a hub of religion and art. Gondar was Ethiopia’s defacto capital from 1635-1867. By this time, the Solomonic dynasty and ethos extant for hundreds of years was well established. Since the Galla at the time were a well-established and powerful ethnic group, the royal family forged strong ties with the Galla through marriage. The Ethiopian imperial monarchy was diluted because of the majority of Galla being Muslims, the throne then was not a legitimate manifestation of Christian power but was an instrument of power wielded by Muslims. One dynasty that laid claim to the Solomonic heritage, as well as being a mainly Christian polity in its hierarchical structure, was Shoa.  Shoa an alternate spelling is Shewa, free of the rampant civil strife sweeping the rest of Ethiopia, was able to create a largely coherent bureaucracy that was characterized by a heterogenous coexistence, among the varying ethnic and religious groups. The unification of Shoa was solidified under a Christian dynastic monarchy, which waged wars of hegemony till the end of the 18th century. In the reign of Sahle Sellassie (1813-1847) an Amhara Negus, he had many childrenone of them being Haile Melekot, the father of Menellek II. When his father was murdered Sahle Sellassie, seized the throne although he had older male siblings. Sahle moved swiftly to consolidate power with the help of his mother’s kinsmen, he marched from the monastery at Sehla Dingay, where he was enrolled as a student, to his father’s capital at Qundi and claimed the succession, he was proclaimed Ras of Showa. Some of his male siblings reached Qundi, at a later date and were promptly imprisoned. Shortly after his proclamation a Ras, he proclaimed himself Negus of Shewa. In 1829, Shewa was hit with a debilitating famine, shortly thereafter a cholera epidemic struck, killing two thirds of the stricken. Again, misfortune struck, when one of the Negus’ generals rebelled, Medoko, several of the elite Matchlockmen (infantry with guns) deserted with him and they joined with the Oromo. Together they burned Angolalla, and waged battles against Shewa. When Sahle Sellassie was able to put down the rebellion (1835), another catastrophe struck, Shewa was afflicted by a drought which decimated crops and livestock, bringing famine to the province. Sahle Sellassie responded to the famine by opening up the royal storehouses to the people, this act greatly enhanced his status with many viewing him as a wise, loving and generous king.  Sahle Sellassie was a great reformer, some of his notable reforms are as follows, he limited executions to murder, treason and sacrilege, executions required the consent of the Negus. He further ceased the practices (torture) of his predecessors, such as brandings with hot irons, executions, and severance of limbs of accused persons and criminals. Many death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment or property forfeiture. Blood money was paid to a murder victim’s relatives, instead of handing them over to the relatives of the victims’ family (an ancient tradition in Ethiopia still practiced at the time). He instituted tax reforms and greatly increased the store of firearms available to the state at the time. He signed friendship treaties with both France and England and even encouraged foreigners to settle in Shoa.In the following, I will highlight Ethiopian Orthodoxy, Ethiopian history, iconography, music, art, and culture. Ethiopian artists have produced an enormous amount of work particularly, the artwork of the Tewahedo Church, murals, manuscripts, ceremonial furniture, including their unique crosses and panel paintings on wood. Ethiopian iconography depicts a wide variety of sacred imagery used for a variety of reasons both devotional and apotropaic objects (amulets), i.e. having the power to ward off evil or bad luck. The national dress of Ethiopia is the Shamma, a rectangular shawl of three feet in width, hand woven from cotton. Men wear jodhpurs, which fit tightly from knee to ankles. Women wear blouses with full skirts of ankle length. Men and women wrap barnos, around their shoulders (especially in the highlands), when the weather cools or is breezy. The national dish of Ethiopia is called injera, a locally made sour, fermented flat bread with a spongelike texture, and wat ot zegeni, which is a type of curried stew made of beef, mutton or chicken, hardboiled eggs are added, and are seasoned in the Ethiopian manner with, red pepper (berbere) and other spices. It is at times served with tedj, a honey mead fermented drink, or tall an Ethiopian beer. Names and naming ceremonies in Ethiopia, like most Middle Eastern and African countries are of paramount importance. Asfa Wossen Asserate, the great grandson of Haile Sellassie, wrote in his book; ‘King of Kings: The Triumph and Tragedy of Emperor Haile Sellassie’, the following: ‘Ethiopian naming conventions have no concept of the division into Christian name and surname that us usual in Europe. People have a single given name. This is often followed by the fathers’ name, thus Tafari Makonnen is Tafari the son of Makonne’. If a child dies, and another is born, the newborn child’s name oftentimes is Kassa, meaning restitution. Common male names are Hagos (joy), Desta (pleasure), Tesfaye (my hope). Some common names for females in Ethiopia are Ababa (flower), Zewditu (crown), Terunesh (you are pure) and a host of others, but these are commonly recognizable even in this work since the famous etege Zewditu Menellek’s daughter’s name is one of the most common female names, in Ethiopia. Common Christian or baptismal male names are, names compounded with for instance Gebre (servant of) an example is Gebre Yesus (servant of Jesus), Walda (son of), Haile (power of), and Habte (gift of). Well known female baptismal names are, often compounded with the following Amete (maid of), like Amete Maryam maid of Mary, or Walatta (daughter of) for example Walatta Sion (daughter of Zion).

The Armenian Massacre.

The outbreak of fighting in Nagorno Karabakh between the Armenians and Azerbaijani’s, are embers of an age-old conflict between the Armenians who are traditionally ‘Christian’, and the Azerbaijani’s who are traditionally adhere to the Islamic creed i.e. Muslims. The massacre and deportation of Turkey’s Armenian population took place against a background of fighting between Turkish and Russian forces, on the Caucasus front. It was described by some scholars, as the first genocide of the 20th century.

This post will focus on the events and socio-political, socio-cultural religious and ethnic differences that shaped, the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict, making both ethnic groups the arch enemies that they are today.

Russia and Ottoman Turkey were multinational empires. Where their borders met in the Caucasus Armenians lived on both sides.

Armenian Nationalism: The Christian Armenians and their Turkish Muslim rulers in Turkey, had a history of conflict stretching back centuries. In the 1890’s Armenian nationalist agitation, served as a pretext for the Turks to slaughter thousands of Armenians. In August 1914, the Turkish government asked Armenian envoys gathered at Erzurum in eastern Turkey, to incite rebellion against Russian hegemony in the Caucasus. The Armenian refused, when Turkey entered World War I, the Caucasus and western Anatolia were turned into war zones. During Turkey’s ill-fated offensive in the winter of 1915, Armenians fought as conscripts in the Turkish and the Russian army. The Russian army also contained Armenians fighting, for liberation from Turkish rule.  Russia encouraged an Armenian revolt against Turkey, likewise the Turks incentivized and fomented an uprising by Turkic peoples and Muslim Kurds living in Russia. The Turkish army was roundly defeated at the Caucasus front at Sarikamish between December 1914 and January 1915.

Ethnic Tensions: The situation in eastern Anatolia was unstable, ethnic tensions were acute. The majority of the population consisted of Muslims, who were displaced from the Russian ruled Caucasus in the 19th century and bitterly resented, the Christian pro-Russian Armenians.

  1. This post will be continued, the continuation will highlight the Armenian Genocide.
  2. It will highlight the history of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
  3. It will highlight the 1990’s situation in Nagorno Karabakh and will touch on the current situation in Nagorno Karabakh.      

ISIS FAR FROM DEFEATED.

The false narrative crafted by the Trump administration and other western governments, that the Islamic State was all but defeated was being rebutted by their own intelligence agencies, since 2018. Even the CIA and other such agencies, consistently refuted the narrative put forth, by their own governments that the ISIS threat no longer existed.  That narrative is increasingly ringing hollow, as yet another headline from the corporate media shows, the following is the latest from one such outlet, The Jerusalem Post.   

‘Three years after ISIS appeared to be on its last legs in Iraq and Syria it has seized a city in Mozambique. The city is called Mocimboa da Praia and now there are fears it may have a foothold that is growing in the country. This slow process of ISIS radicalization has taken place for a year or more. However, it was largely dismissed as fear mongering. Now the group has infiltrated, and some are concerned that it may be on the cusp of a larger offensive. Much like in the ISIS offensive in Iraq in the summer of 2014 the attacks in southeast Africa have displaced hundreds of thousands. There are questions about how the port city might be re-taken by security forces.  The port now affects the whole of Cabo Delgado province. This is in northern Mozambique. The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned of a humanitarian crisis that may grow. While some still argue that ISIS is not actually causing or driving the war here, but it is instead just inequality and poverty, the kinds of images from Mozambique look like the same Islamist insurgencies in Nigeria or Somalia or other areas. While the international community is distracted by COVID-19 and major powers like the US no longer play a role in coordinating efforts like concentrating on these kinds of emergencies, ISIS can thrive in the margins.’

VIRTUAL SECURITY CONFERENCE 2020.

From 27 – 31 July, 2020, CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) will host the first-ever Virtual Security Conference in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), under the heading of ‘Securing Our Caribbean Community Within The Era Of Covid-19 and Beyond’.

The crisis presented by coronavirus (COVID-19) is unprecedented in CARICOM. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, Governments across the Region imposed several measures, including social distancing, restrictions, border closures and suspension of non-essential services to prevent the spread of the pandemic. In support of these measures, law enforcement and security officials played a crucial role to prevent and control the spread of the virus, while at the same time managing and operating within the changing multi-dimensional security environment.

In an effort to understand how the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the security environment and the operations of law enforcement and security officials, as well as to identify best practices that can be applied to similar situations in the future; CARICOM IMPACS will bring together a network of practitioners, security experts, government officials, academics, private sector representatives and civil society officials to discuss the challenges, impact and implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Security of our Region. The Virtual Conference will address the following thematic areas such as:

 

 

  • Peace, Security & Development – A Roadmap For The Future In The Context of COVID-19;
  • Criminality & Organised Crime During COVID-19: Present and Future Trends;
  • Policing In The Time of a Pandemic- Lessons Learnt;
  • Enhancing Cyber Security In The Age of COVID-19;
  • COVID-19 & the Future of Borders;
  • Crisis and Gender Based Violence;
  • Climate Change and Security- Building Resilience in Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
  • Impact and Implications of COVID-19 on Prisons and Correctional Services; and
  • Maritime Security and the Blue Economy

CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES

The CARICOM Virtual Security Conference will gather leading representatives from government, regional and international agencies, academia, private sector and civil society organisations to discuss the impact and implications of COVID 19 and measures to respond.

Specifically, the Virtual Security Conference will:

  • Consider how COVID-19 is shaping the security landscape today and in the future;
  • Identify how COVID-19 has impacted criminality and organized crime and the implications for the future;
  • Facilitate constructive exchange of information, best practices and lessons identified during the COVID-19 outbreak, so that states can strengthen their abilities to continue to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare and response to future pandemics;
  • Assess and evaluate the threats and opportunities created by the COVID-19 pandemic;
  • Explore how the pandemic impacted law enforcement and security officials roles, responsibilities and standard operating procedures, resilience and food security among other issues;
  • Provide a consultative forum for discussion between leading practitioners and representatives from the government, regional and international agencies, academia, private sector and civil society. This is especially important when speaking of Border Security and border movements post pandemic.

CONFERENCE OUTCOME

The Virtual Conference will serve as source material for the development of a “Lessons Learnt and Guidance Document for Preparing for and Responding to Threats such as Pandemics and other crises”. 

 

Caribbean Countries among those benefitting from UN SDG Financing.

Media Release Courtesy UN Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean

Bridgetown, Barbados – As Eastern Caribbean countries strive to build back better from COVID-19 and accelerate progress toward attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),  support is being provided as part of a historic United Nations Joint SDG Fund US$60 million grant launched to close the SDG financing gap and foster more inclusive, sustainable and resilient countries across the world.

In response to a global call, United Nations Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, in collaboration with the governments of Barbados, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, has been awarded a USD$1 million Joint SDG Fund Grant after successfully submitting a proposal for a joint programme entitled ‘Harnessing Blue Economy Finance for SIDS Recovery and Sustainable Development’. 

The initiative will support the efforts of the three participating Eastern Caribbean governments to develop financing strategies in the Blue Economy and create an enabling framework for SDG investment. The successful proposal was among 62 joint programmes selected from 258 submissions supporting interventions in over 100 countries.

The two-year USD$1,140,000 Joint Programme will be led by the United National Development Programme (UNDP), with participation from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It will also benefit from counterpart funding of USD$140,000 from the three participating UN agencies.

The joint UN SDG Fund is a critical facet of the ongoing global UN reform, which enables the UN Sub-regional team in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean to access funding for SDG acceleration support to countries, working under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator, by leveraging the individual strengths of specialized funds, agencies and programmes, to ‘deliver results as one’ and ensure that no one is left behind.

In welcoming the new joint initiative, that exemplifies the UN’s approach to ‘deliver as one’, UN Resident Coordinator, Didier Trebucq noted:

“This presents another opportunity for the UN development system working cohesively, to deepen its partnerships with Governments of the Eastern Caribbean and to foster blue economic growth through innovative financing mechanisms, while ensuring that the SDGs are at the forefront of national policy and no one is left behind.”

With the Blue Economy engaged as a driver for regional economic recovery and development, emphasis will be placed on creating an enabling environment for Blue Economy financing by identifying policy gaps, key opportunities and specific financing mechanisms for achieving resilient growth. This catalytic investment will address the current financial challenges of the beneficiary countries, including the additional financial burden arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, and build on existing partnerships with the private sector and development financing institutions, as well as existing UN projects on Blue Economy and other SDG-related areas in-country.

Speaking on the significance of the initiative, UNDP Resident Representative Magdy Martinez-Soliman stated:

“The COVID-19 crisis has affected the Caribbean’s ambitions to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals. It has drained away resources that were much needed to finance the SDGs. This Joint Programme will support Barbados, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, in their efforts to develop financing strategies in the Blue Economy and SDG investments. The three countries are at the vanguard of the Blue Economy “wave” in the region.”  

The UN investments in 62 Joint Programmes around the world will offer pragmatic solutions, all assessed as relevant in the context of the COVID-19 crisis: from addressing reduced fiscal space to align with the SDGs amidst COVID-19 recovery and financial planning to co-creating a new generation of risk-sensitive and responsive Integrated National Financing Frameworks. The results of the investment in SDG financing interventions will begin to materialize in the first quarter of 2021, and a second component is expected to be launched by the Joint SDG Fund soon that would allow other countries to benefit.

Learn more: SDG Financing portfolio.

COVID 19’s Effect on Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

St Peters Sint Martin: By Wade A Bailey.

 

 

I cite the World Bank 2020 report listed below under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/3.0/ igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license.

 

World Bank. 2020. Global Economic Prospects, June 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1553-9. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

ISSN: 1014-8906 ISBN (paper): 978-1-4648-1553-9 ISBN (electronic): 978-1-4648-1580-5 DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1553-9

 

What follows are various citations and highlights from the report listed previously, the report is used in documenting pertinent facts, that will highlight the dire looming possible economic crisis, that could engulf the global economy. The dire economic scenario presented previously, proves the unsustainability of the ‘one pillar’ economic model used, in the past by regional governments including Sint Martin, its inability to sustain the island’s populace, in a post-Covid19 world.

Global Outlook: Pandemic, Recession: The Global Economy in Crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic has, with alarming speed, delivered a global economic shock of enormous magnitude, leading to steep recessions in many countries. The baseline forecast envisions a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020—the deepest global recession in eight decades, despite unprecedented policy support. Per capita incomes in the vast majority of EMDEs are expected to shrink this year. The global recession would be deeper if bringing the pandemic under control took longer than expected, or if financial stress triggered cascading defaults. The pandemic highlights the urgent need for health and economic policy action—including global cooperation—to cushion its consequences, protect vulnerable populations, and improve countries’ capacity to prevent and cope with similar events in the future. Since EMDEs are particularly vulnerable, it is critical to strengthen their public health care systems, to address the challenges posed by informality and limited safety nets, and, once the health crisis abates, to undertake reforms that enable strong and sustainable growth. Regional Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19. The rapid rise of COVID-19 cases, together with the wide range of measures to slow the spread of the virus, has slowed economic activity precipitously in many EMDEs. Economic disruptions are likely to be more severe and protracted in those countries with larger domestic outbreaks, greater exposure to international spillovers (particularly through exposure to global commodity and financial markets, global value chains, and tourism), and larger pre-existing challenges such as informality. Growth forecasts for all regions have been severely downgraded; Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Europe and Central Asia (ECA) in particular have large downgrades partly because of the size of their domestic outbreaks and exposure to global spillovers, while South Asia’s substantial downgrade is primarily the result of stringent lockdown measures. Many countries have avoided more adverse outcomes through sizable fiscal and monetary policy support measures. Despite these measures, per capita incomes in all EMDE regions are expected to contract in 2020, likely causing many millions to fall back into poverty. This edition of Global Economic Prospects also includes analytical chapters on the short- and long-term growth impact of the pandemic, as well as on global implications of the recent plunge in oil prices. Lasting Scars of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has struck a devastating blow to an already-fragile global economy. Lockdowns and other restrictions needed to Executive Summary COVID-19 has triggered a global crisis like no other—a global health crisis that, in addition to an enormous human toll, is leading to the deepest global recession since the second world war. While the ultimate growth outcome is still uncertain, and an even worse scenario is possible if it takes longer to bring the health crisis under control, the pandemic will result in output contractions across the vast majority of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Moreover, the pandemic is likely to exert lasting damage to fundamental determinants of long-term growth prospects, further eroding living standards for years to come. The immediate policy priorities are to alleviate the ongoing health and human costs and attenuate the near-term economic losses, while addressing challenges such as informality and weak social safety nets that have heightened the impact on vulnerable populations. Once the crisis abates, it will be necessary to reaffirm credible commitment to sustainable policies—including medium-term fiscal frameworks in energy-exporting EMDEs suffering from the large plunge in oil prices—and undertake the necessary reforms to buttress long-term growth prospects. For these actions, global coordination and cooperation will be critical. xvi address the public health crisis, together with spontaneous reductions in economic activity by many consumers and producers, constitute an unprecedented combination of adverse shocks that is causing deep recessions in many advanced economies and EMDEs. Those EMDEs that have weak health systems; those that rely heavily on global trade, tourism, or remittances from abroad; and those that depend on commodity exports will be particularly hard-hit. Beyond its short-term impact, deep recessions triggered by the pandemic are likely to leave lasting scars through multiple channels, including lower investment; erosion of the human capital of the unemployed; and a retreat from global trade and supply linkages. These effects may well lower potential growth and labor productivity in the longer term. Immediate policy measures should support health care systems and moderate the short-term impact of the pandemic on activity and employment. In addition, a comprehensive reform drive is needed to reduce the adverse impact of the pandemic on long-term growth prospects by improving governance and business environments and expanding investment in education and public health. Adding Fuel to the Fire: Cheap Oil during the Pandemic. The outbreak of COVID-19 and the wide-ranging measures needed to slow its advance have precipitated an unprecedented collapse in oil demand, a surge in oil inventories, and, in March, the steepest one-month decline in oil prices on record. In the context of the current restrictions on a broad swath of economic activity, low oil prices are unlikely to do much to buffer the effects of the pandemic, but they may provide some initial support for a recovery once these restrictions begin to be lifted. Like other countries, energy exporting EMDEs face an unprecedented public health crisis, but their fiscal positions were already strained even before the recent collapse in oil revenues. To help retain access to market-based financing for fiscal support programs, these EMDEs will need to make credible commitments to a sustainable medium-term fiscal position. For some of them, current low oil prices provide an opportunity to implement energy-pricing policies that yield efficiency and fiscal gains over the medium term.

The COVID-19 pandemic has, with alarming speed, delivered a global economic shock of enormous magnitude, leading to steep recessions in many countries. The baseline forecast envisions a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020—the deepest global recession in eight decades, despite unprecedented policy support. Per capita incomes in the vast majority of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are expected to shrink this year, tipping many millions back into poverty. The global recession would be deeper if bringing the pandemic under control took longer than expected, or if financial stress triggered cascading defaults. The pandemic highlights the urgent need for health and economic policy action—including global cooperation—to cushion its consequences, protect vulnerable populations, and improve countries’ capacity to prevent and cope with similar events in the future. Since EMDEs are particularly vulnerable, it is critical to strengthen their public health care systems, to address the challenges posed by informality and limited safety nets, and, once the health crisis abates, to undertake reforms that enable strong and sustainable growth.

Summary The COVID-19 pandemic has spread with astonishing speed to every part of the world and infected millions   The health and human toll is already large and continues to grow, with hundreds of thousands of deaths and many more suffering from diminished prospects and disrupted livelihoods. The pandemic represents the largest economic shock the world economy has witnessed in decades, causing a collapse in global activity   Various mitigation measures—such as lockdowns, closure of schools and non-essential business, and travel restrictions—have been imposed by most countries to limit the spread of COVID-19 and ease the strain on health care systems. The pandemic and associated mitigation measures have sharply curbed consumption and investment, as well as restricted labor supply and production. The cross-border spill overs have disrupted financial and commodity markets, global trade, supply chains, travel, and tourism. Financial markets have been extremely volatile, reflecting exceptionally high uncertainty and the worsening outlook. Flight to safety led to a sharp tightening of global and EMDE financial conditions. Equity markets around the world plunged, spreads on riskier categories of debt widened considerably, and EMDEs experienced large capital outflows in much of March and April that bottomed out only recently. Commodity prices have declined sharply as a result of falling global demand, with oil particularly affected (Figure 1.1.D). Many countries have provided large-scale macroeconomic support to alleviate the economic blow, which has contributed to a recent stabilization in financial markets. Central banks in advanced economies have cut policy rates and taken other far-reaching steps to provide liquidity and to maintain investor confidence. In many EMDEs, central banks have also eased monetary policy. The fiscal policy support that has been announced already far exceeds that enacted during the 2008-09 global financial crisis. In all, the pandemic is expected to plunge a majority of countries into recession this year, with per capita output contracting in the largest fraction of countries since 1870. Advanced economies are projected to shrink by 7 percent in 2020, as widespread social-distancing measures, a sharp tightening of financial conditions, and a collapse in external demand depress activity. Assuming that the outbreak remains under control and activity recovers later this year, China is projected to slow to 1 percent in 2020—by far the lowest growth it has registered in more than four decades. Due to the negative spillovers from weakness in major economies, alongside the disruptions associated with their own domestic outbreaks, EMDE GDP is forecast to contract by 2.5 percent in 2020. This would be well below the previous trough in EMDE growth of 0.9 percent in 1982, and the lowest rate since at least 1960, the earliest year with available aggregate data. EMDEs with large domestic COVID-19 outbreaks and limited health care capacity; that are deeply integrated in global value chains; that are heavily dependent on foreign financing; and that rely extensively on international trade, commodity exports, and tourism will suffer disproportionately. Commodity-exporting EMDEs will be hard hit by adverse spillovers from sharply weaker growth in China, and by the collapse in global commodity demand, especially for oil. With more than 90 percent of EMDEs expected to experience contractions in per capita incomes this year, many millions are likely to fall back into poverty. With advanced economies contracting, China experiencing record-low growth, and EMDE growth savaged by external and domestic headwinds, the global economy is expected to shrink by 5.2 percent this year in a baseline forecast. This would be the deepest global recession since World War II, and almost three times as steep as the 2009 global recession.

The 2020 global recession is expected to be the deepest in eight decades, and the subsequent recovery will be insufficient to bring output to previously projected levels. Amid heightened uncertainty, worse outcomes could arise if the pandemic and economic disruptions persist or cascading defaults amid high debt lead to financial crises. A lack of space is constraining fiscal responses in many EMDEs. Building resilient health care systems is critical to prevent similar crises. With ongoing recessions exerting scarring effects on potential output, pursuing reforms that bolster long-term growth prospects will be essential.

 

The forecast assumes that the pandemic recedes in such a way that domestic mitigation measures can be lifted by mid-year, adverse global spill overs ease during the second half of the year, and dislocations in financial markets are not long-lasting. Although a moderate recovery is envisioned in 2021, with global growth reaching 4.2 percent, output is not expected to return to its previously expected levels. Since uncertainty around the outlook remains exceptionally high, alternative scenarios help illustrate the range of plausible global growth outcomes in the. In particular, the baseline forecast for 2020 could prove optimistic. If COVID-19 outbreaks persist longer than expected, restrictions on movement and interactions may have to be maintained or reintroduced, prolonging the disruptions to domestic activity and further setting back confidence. Disruptions to activity would weaken businesses’ ability to remain in operation and service their debt, while the increase in risk aversion could raise interest rates for higher-risk borrowers. With debt levels already at historic highs, this could lead to cascading defaults and financial crises across many economies .Under this downside scenario, global growth would shrink almost 8 percent in 2020. The recovery that follows would be markedly sluggish, hampered by severely impaired balance sheets, heightened financial market stress and widespread bankruptcies in EMDEs. In 2021, global growth would barely begin to recover, increasing to just over 1 percent. In contrast, in an upside scenario, a sharp economic rebound would begin promptly if pandemic-control measures could be largely lifted in the near term, and fiscal and monetary policy responses succeed in supporting consumer and investor confidence, leading to a prompt normalization of financial conditions and the unleashing of pent-up demand. However, even with these positive developments, the near-term contraction in global activity of more than 3 percent in 2020 would still be much larger than during the global recession of 2009, and EMDE growth would also be negative. Once pandemic control measures are fully lifted, global growth would rebound markedly in 2021, to above 5 percent. Policymakers face formidable challenges as they seek to contain the devastating health, macroeconomic, and social effects of the pandemic. During the last global recession, in 2009, many EMDEs were able to implement large -scale fiscal and monetary responses. Today, however, many EMDEs are less prepared to weather a global downturn and must simultaneously grapple with a severe public health crisis with heavy human costs. Particularly vulnerable EMDEs include those that have weak health systems; those that rely heavily on global trade, tourism, and remittances; those that are prone to financial market disruptions; and those that depend on oil and other commodity exports. EMDEs where poverty and informality are widespread, including many low-income countries, are also vulnerable, since their poor have limited access to proper sanitation and adequate social safety nets, and often suffer greater food insecurity . An arsenal of macroprudential support policies has been deployed in EMDEs to maintain financial sector resilience and promote lending during the crisis. These include relaxing capital and liquidity coverage requirements, allowing banks to draw down capital and liquidity buffers, and encouraging banks to offer temporary loan repayment holidays to distressed borrowers. Further, many countries have initiated debt moratoria and government guarantees on bank loans to strengthen bank balance sheets and support distressed borrowers. Policymakers would, however, need to carefully balance some of these actions against jeopardizing the future stability of the financial sector. Once economic activity begins to normalize, they will also need to prudently withdraw the large-scale policy stimulus provided during the crisis without endangering the recovery. Meanwhile, many EMDEs have introduced fiscal measures to expand social safety nets and protect those most vulnerable, including wage support to preserve jobs, increased access to unemployment benefits, and targeted cash transfers to low-income households. In EMDEs with wider fiscal space, the policy response has been markedly greater than in those more constrained by higher debt levels. For many energy exporting EMDEs, fiscal balances are deteriorating as oil prices have fallen below fiscal break-even prices. Elevated debt burdens in some low- and middle-income countries also underscore the need for temporary debt relief. In this context, global coordination and cooperation—of the measures needed to slow the spread of the pandemic, and of the economic actions needed to alleviate the economic damage, including international support—provide the greatest chance of achieving public health goals and enabling a robust global recovery. In the near term, COVID-19 has underscored the need for governments to prioritize the timely and transparent dissemination of accurate information in order to stem the spread of the disease, and to build public trust. In the long term, the pandemic has laid bare the weaknesses of national health care and social safety nets in many countries. It has also exposed the severe consequences of widespread informality and financing constraints for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in many EMDEs   There is a critical need to invest in resilient health care systems that prioritize national health security, in order to prevent and mitigate similar crises   It is also necessary to put in place social benefit systems that can provide an effective, flexible, and efficient safety net during disasters. Such systems can be augmented by measures to deliver income support and emergency financing to vulnerable groups such as the poor, urban slum dwellers, migrants, and informal firms. In particular, digital technologies can enhance the provision of cash transfers and other critical support measures, as well as facilitate the flow of remittances. In many countries, deep recessions triggered by COVID-19 will likely weigh on potential output for years to come. Governments can take steps to alleviate the adverse impact of the crisis on potential output by placing a renewed emphasis on reforms that can boost long-term growth prospects.

More to follow.

 

 

 

 

Regional Mobility actors charged to ‘Get Started.

(Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Press Release, 25 June 2020 |Bridgetown, Barbados) –  Stakeholders in the energy and transportation sectors were charged not to wait until a comprehensive plan and perfect conditions are available in order to get started on the Regional Electric Vehicle Strategy during an online discussion, which focused on innovation opportunities and the Caribbean reality.

The discussion, which was hosted by the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE) and the Energy Unit of the CARICOM Secretariat, saw more than two hundred and fifty stakeholders gathered to hear from regional and global experts in the field. Stakeholders also had the opportunity to express their opinions and have their queries addressed.

The Need for Regional Coordination

During the online event, attendees in majority identified cost as the most important factor when deciding on an electric vehicle (EV) purchase versus an Internal Combustible Engine (ICE) vehicle. In response, panelist Xavier Gordon shared that the total cost of ownership of an EV was lower when compared to an ICE vehicle, as global market trends show a decline in EV costs.  He warned, however, that there was a need to produce economies of scale in the region, which could, in turn, further reduce costs for CARICOM Member States and consumers, particularly procurement costs.

Mr. Gordon added that both public-private partnerships, particularly in the installation of charging infrastructure, and regulator-utility collaboration for the development of attractive charging prices for consumers, were key innovative approaches to support the adoption of EVs. To stimulate market response in the region, project implementation and demonstration were important, panelists shared.  Antonio Sealy of the Barbados Light and Power Company Limited revealed that when the Electric Bus Project commenced in Barbados, they began to receive significant interest from global EV service providers.

Innovation Opportunities & Challenges

Head of the CARICOM Energy Unit, Dr Devon Gardner, responded to the charge to “get started” by sharing that CARICOM, with the financial support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) implemented TAPSEC Project, was in the process of having a Regional Electric Vehicle Strategy (REVS) prepared. Project implementation will continue at the same time, with a view to having relevant projects inform the strategy. This was in line with another recommendation from panelist Andrea Denzinger, who suggested that the region implement pilot projects and allow them to create data and build trust.

In their quest to support the development of the sustainable transport sector, the CARICOM Secretariat – through its Energy Unit – and the CCREEE have established a Regional Electric Vehicle Working Group to produce the Regional Electric Vehicle Strategy Framework. Having been presented with an overview of the framework, eighty-five percent (85%) of participants joining the discussion indicated that they were sufficiently convinced of the need for such a strategy. Nonetheless, there were cautions in light of the financial implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. Panelist Xavier Gordon shared that he completed the region’s first empirical meter reading study in 2017 and, the results show that electrification makes sense for the region. Nevertheless, he noted that access to finance may be significantly slowed as countries and donors redirect available funds.

The Caribbean Reality

Within the region, several opportunities exist to propel a transition towards wide-spread use of electric mobility, according to panelists. Sharing on the Barbados experience in implementing the Electric Bus Project where 33 electric buses are being procured, panelist Antonio Sealy told attendees that there was tremendous value to the transport sector, through electrification of public transportation. He maintained that cost benefits were to be found through fueling and maintenance, with estimated savings of BBD $2M annually for the current project. Improved comfort and commuter experiences, as well as reduced environmental impact through lessenend noise and greenhouse gas emissions were also identified as advantages.

The University of the West Indies is also supporting the electric mobility sector through their Electric Vehicle Research and Development Platform (EVRDP) and, an application developed to control charging time, to avoid congestion in the electrical network. Professor Chandrabhan Sharma explained the characteristics of EV charging, noting that uncoordinated charging could put significant stress on the power system, whereas providing power from a vehicle to the grid could contribute to stabilising the power grid and improve contribution of intermittent renewable energy supply to the electrical network.

This discussion was another step toward the development and implementation of the Regional Electric Vehicle Strategy which will lean on lessons learned from other jurisdictions and projects; and incorporate plans and approaches to produce economies of scale, within CARICOM. This is all to be accomplished with the ultimate goal of transforming the regional energy sector, for the benefit of Caribbean people.

Caribbean Economies in the Era of COVID-19.

Pandemics, natural disasters exacerbated by climate change, have dramatically altered the way, that Caribbean economies conduct business and interact with international actors, in the trade, commerce, and tourism fields. A recent World Bank report, April 12, 2020, highlighted some of the pros and cons of doing business in this ‘crisis’ environment. What follows is a Caribbean centric perspective, which considers the unique position, of Sint Martin as a so-called ‘hub’, in a Caribbean context. This analysis also examines the post-colonial relationship of the Netherlands vis a vis Sint Martin, which relationship taints every aspect of Sint Martin’s foreign policy efforts, to the detriment of the island and its people.

The World Bank report noted that because of global travel restrictions, in light of COVID 19: ‘Air traffic has fallen to a trickle. The resulting collapse in tourism will severely affect countries in the Caribbean basin’.  The report further stated that the financial crisis, on a regional scale is a distinct possibility. Domestically and here on Sint Martin, most debtors are unable to service their debts and are calling for debt relief. The question of liquidity support, for the government of Sint Martin from the Dutch government is fraught with a multiplicity of issues.

  1. The government of the Netherlands insists to attach, draconian demands on the local government as a prerequisite for liquidity support.
  2. The differences in culture temperament, mores, and values are key and ongoing factors, for the loggerheads experienced by the two governments.

The so-called Dutch Caribbean, namely Curacao, Sint Martin, Aruba, Bonaire, Saba, and St Eustacia, traditionally have been stable islands. In contemporary times however a confluence of factors have increasingly brought to the fore, our unique vulnerabilities and resiliency in the face of natural disasters, pandemics, and climate change. These factors have caused and exacerbated social unrest, as on Sint Martin North and South, when we witnessed massive looting and wanton destruction of property, perpetrated by persons from a broad stratum, of society.

In the economic explanation, years of slow economic growth and the need for fiscal adjustments are straining the capacity of the population to cope. In the social explanation, Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the highest levels of inequality, with wide gaps in living standards breeding frustration. Regional governments, response should be better economic opportunities for the worse- off, with a determined focus on service delivery and social protection. The exact opposite is taking place. On Sint Martin, the poorest are being taxed into perpetual penury, while millionaires have offshore accounts whose sole purpose is to avoid paying taxes locally.

The COVID-19 Outbreak.

 

The first Covid-19 case was diagnosed in China on December 10, 2019, and the first death and the first death was recorded one month later, on January 9th, 2020. Thereafter the amount of registered cases has surpassed one million. Since then there have been over nine million confirmed cases and nearly half a million deaths. Some governments in the Caribbean have opened back their airports, including the government of Sint Martin. Florida now one of the epicenters of the Covid-19 virus is not on the list of nations whose citizens are banned from entering Sint Martin. The Sint Martin government is risking the lives of 1000’s of people on the island with this move. Again, as a result of its dependency on tourism, the government is willing to gamble with the lives of people, in order to earn a dollar. More to come soon on this topic.